Belisarius: The Last Roman General Page 20
At the same time at the Cornelian gate, which was defended by Constantinus, the topography and the plant cover enable the Goths to reach the walls without being seen. The Byzantine catapults could not fire down at them and the defenders were exposed to danger if they leaned far enough over the walls to aim their bows at the attackers. In desperation, the men on the top of Hadrian’s tomb broke up the statues and hurled them down upon the attackers. The attack was repulsed and, as the Goths withdrew, they came under fire from the artillery on the walls. Similarly, an attack on the Pancratian Gate, held by Paulus, also made no headway.
Strangely, the Flaminian Gate, held by the Reges infantry unit (the descendants of the Regii of the Notitia Dignitatum) under the command of Ursicinus, was not attacked at all.
Events at the Porta Chiusa (Vivarium Gate) were different to the others. Here, the original wall had crumbled – possibly due to subsidence – and a section of wall had been added outside this to protect the damaged part. The space between the two walls was known as the Vivarium, as animals were often kept there. A Gothic mine had been dug in order to collapse the outer wall at this point. Bessas and Peranius, who were in control of this area, were hard pressed by the Goths and so sent to Belisarius for help. The arrival of the general restored morale and, taking note of events, Belisarius allowed the Gothic mine to complete its work. When the Goths entered the breach they found themselves faced with another wall. At this point Belisarius ordered Cyprian and his men to attack the Goths in the Vivarium. The Goths panicked and began to flee back through the breach. As the Goths were milling around in confusion at this unexpected setback, Belisarius launched a sortie that routed them and they fled in panic back to their camps. The victorious Byzantines again burned the Gothic siege engines and retired behind the walls.
The first Gothic attempt upon Rome had failed. Belisarius had shown his men that they could defeat the Goths, and had shown the Goths that the capture of Rome would not be as easy as Witigis had led them to believe. Belisarius’ deployment of his troops, his rapid assessment of the situation, and his expert timing of sallies that caught the Goths unawares and resulted in them receiving heavy casualties, must all be applauded; this was a masterpiece of defensive warfare.
In spite of his successes, Belisarius knew that he did not have the forces to raise the siege or win the war. Consequently, he despatched messengers to Justinian requesting reinforcements, informing the emperor that in leaving garrisons in selected strongholds he had been force to reduce the number of available men to only 5,000. Procopius states that, as the Goths had 150,000 men, Belisarius requested reinforcements to bring him up to a parity with Gothic numbers (Proc, Wars, V.xxiv.1-9). This is clearly unrealistic, since the emperor did not have that number of troops in the entire imperial army, and is a further example of Procopius’ willingness to exaggerate the numbers of the Goths in order to glorify the achievement of Belisarius. In fact, Justinian had already sent reinforcements. The foederati that had served alongside Belisarius in Africa, under Valerian and Martinus, had already been recalled to Constantinople before being dispatched for Italy. Unfortunately, the weather had trapped them in Greece. Belisarius was informed of their impending arrival and waited in Rome for their coming.
Recognising that he did not have enough troops, and that most of the men in the city could not work due to the siege, Belisarius enrolled the citizens to fight alongside the regular troops, paying them wages for their services. Since the men had no other means of income, the measure was a success as it increased Belisarius’ manpower whilst at the same time increasing the loyalty of the citizens to their new commander. It was a brilliant stroke of propaganda.
Witigis
Baulked in his assault upon the city, Witigis decided that his next move would be to seize the Roman harbour at Portus. This is where incoming ships transferred their cargo to smaller boats and barges which then transported the goods upriver to Rome. Three days after the assault, he led his men south and captured Portus on or around 13 March 537, leaving 1,000 men as a garrison. The move increased the difficulties for the defenders. Although the Goths did not surround the city, Rome still had a large population to feed. These had been supplied by river, but with Portus taken supplies had to be landed at the port of Antium, which was near to Portus, taken overland to Ostia – a day’s journey – and then taken overland from Ostia to Rome. Supplies in the city began to decline.
Angered by the treachery of the Roman citizens, Witigis sent orders to Ravenna that the senators earlier taken as hostage should be executed. Rumour of the order arrived early and a few of the senators managed to escape. The rest were killed.
Belisarius
Once he realised that the Goths, although repulsed, were going to maintain the siege, Belisarius sent the women and children to Naples in order to reduce the burden on the food supplies. The rations in the city would now last longer. He would also not need to worry about their safety should the Goths force entry to the city.
Worried about the possibility of treachery, he ordered the guards at the city gates to be rotated frequently in order to minimise their opportunity for betrayal. At night he sent men to camp near to the moat, safe in the knowledge that the Goths had not yet recovered from their defeat and would not attempt an attack on any such forces. These men helped to reduce the possibility of treachery by not allowing the Goths close access to the walls under cover of darkness.
A letter was now discovered, allegedly linking Pope Silverius to a plot to restore the city to the Goths. Forged by Julianus, the praetorianus, and Marcus, a scholasticus, the letter was given to Belisarius who ordered that Silverius be sent to Lycia. On 29th March Vigilius was ordained as the new Pope, allegedly by the order of Theodora. Justinian later ordered that Silverius be returned to Italy, pending an investigation. Belisarius surrendered him to the custody of Vigilius, whose men starved him to death. Vigilius is said to have promised to give Belisarius 200 pounds of gold for his support; it was not the only hint of scandal linked to Belisarius during the siege.
In a similar manner, Belisarius also ordered that many senators be sent out of the city to forestall any attempts at betrayal. Although the commoners had been recruited into the army and paid, so ensuring their loyalty, the Pope and the senators, being of a higher class, probably declined to take an active part in the defence. Feeling no obligations towards Belisarius, their loyalty was suspect, especially since they had already betrayed the city once before, when they had allowed Belisarius to gain entry.
Belisarius takes the Initiative
Twenty days after the Gothic capture of Portus, and twenty three since the failed assault, so probably around 5 April, Martinus and Valerian finally arrived with their 1,600 foederati. These cavalrymen were mainly Huns, Slavonians and Slavic Antae – cavalry archers of proven ability. More confident due to the reinforcements, Belisarius decided to adopt a more aggressive stance.
On the following day he instructed one of his bodyguards, by the name of Trajan, to take 200 bucellarii out of the city via the Salarian Gate to a nearby hill. Once there, the cavalry were to engage the enemy using only their bows, but, when the supply of arrows was exhausted, to retire to the safety of the city. At the same time, Belisarius ordered the catapults on that section of the walls to be made ready to cover the retreat.
Trajan carried out the order, riding to the hill and starting to shoot at the Goths. Disturbed by this new development, the Goths seized the equipment that they had to hand and rushed out of their camps. When all of their arrows were expended the Byzantines began their withdrawal, with the enemy in close pursuit. As they came within range of the walls the catapults began to fire, killing many of the Goths and prompting the rest to immediately abandon the pursuit and retire out of range. In this engagement Procopius claims that the Goths lost 1,000 men killed (Wars, V.xxvii. 11), but again the figure has been exaggerated for the benefit of Belisarius. It is unlikely that many Byzantines were casualties, since the Goths had little response to their
use of archery.
Four days later, Belisarius repeated the tactic. On this occasion 300 bucellarii led by Mundilas, another of Belisarius’ bodyguards, caused a greater number of casualties than the original sortie. Finally, after another lapse of a few days, Belisarius repeated the tactic, sending another guardsman, Oilas, again with 300 bucellarii. In the course of three engagements, Procopius claims that the Byzantines killed around 4,000 men, although doubtless he has distorted the number of Gothic losses.
Witigis
Procopius now describes Witigis’ response to Belisarius’ tactics (Wars, V.xxvii. 15-23). Without fully understanding the reasoning behind Belisarius’ ruse, Witigis now attempted a similar stratagem. He sent 500 men to demonstrate near to the city without advancing near enough for them to suffer casualties from the catapults on the walls. Immediately grasping the situation, Belisarius sent 1,000 men under Bessas to engage the Goths. Forced to retire under a hail of Byzantine arrows, the Goths were surrounded and almost annihilated.
Failing to understand the reasons for the defeat, Witigis insulted the survivors and accused them of cowardice. Three days later, with 500 men gathered from all of the camps, Witigis again employed the identical ruse. The result was the same. This time, 1,500 of the foederati under Martinus and Valerian destroyed the Goths he had sent.
However, Procopius may not be telling the whole truth, either in order to magnify the abilities of Belisarius when compared to the (apparently inept) Witigis, or due to his inability to grasp the finer details of generalship. It is possible that Witigis was attempting to duplicate the ruse used by Belisarius, yet a close analysis of the text reveals the difficulties both he and Belisarius faced. It is too easily forgotten that the areas around the walls of the city would not have been open grassland. Instead, there would have been fields, vineyards, fences and all of the other obstacles presented by Roman farming techniques. In such restricted terrain, the bow would not have greatly outranged the javelin and, as a consequence, the attempt to replicate the ruse was not actually too farfetched.
Yet there was one factor in which Belisarius was superior to Witigis: his supply of excellent junior officers and the superior quality of the troops he used. Trajan, Mundilas and Oilas were all members of his personal bodyguard and men who could be trusted to translate his orders into action. Furthermore, on these operations Belisarius did not send out the regular cavalry of the army, using instead small numbers of his personal comitatus; bucellarii of proven ability and daring. These superior troops with excellent leaders fulfilled the task perfectly.
Witigis did not have such a luxury. His leaders and troops were not as highly trained and efficient as the bodyguards and bucellarii and so failed to follow the plan, allowing themselves to be surrounded and practically annihilated. Three days later, Witigis repeated the attempt, but again his troops were defeated with heavy loss.
Yet it may be that Witigis was not actually attempting to repeat the Byzantines’ tactic. It is possible that he was, at least in part, attempting to seize the initiative and deprive Belisarius of the terrain near to the walls from which to effect his hit-and-run tactics. By occupying the high ground outside the city walls from which the Byzantines had been launching their attacks, he may have been pre-empting their assaults and attempting to tighten the siege, whilst at the same time ensuring that army morale remained high. Whichever theory is correct, the strategy failed: The Goths were defeated and Belisarius retained the initiative, which was to be the undoing of the Goths.
Recognising their danger, the Goths now reverted to maintaining the siege: when Belisarius repeated his tactics, the Goths simply drove the Byzantine cavalry away by a controlled charge that did not leave them vulnerable to a counter attack or from missiles from the city walls.
The episode illustrates Belisarius’ ability as a general; it was a superb use of the strengths of his horse archers – mobility and firepower – against the weakness of cavalry that relied on hand-to-hand combat to defeat the enemy. On the other hand, Witigis’ attempt to use the stratagem demonstrates that, although he understood what was happening, he did not have the highly-trained manpower necessary to repeat Belisarius’ tactics for himself.
It was at about this time that Belisarius confided to his friends that he had always been confident of victory over the Goths. Like the Vandals, the Gothic cavalry had no answer to the Byzantine horse archers, being unable to close with the enemy and fight whilst still suffering casualties from a distance. Only if vastly outnumbered and threatened with encirclement would the Byzantines be in any danger of defeat by the Vandal horsemen. Although in theory the Gothic foot archers could be used to counter the threat, these were – understandably – too timid to face the Byzantine cavalry on their own, and so needed a covering force of heavy infantry to act as a screen. Unfortunately for the Goths, the heavily-armed men manoeuvred too slowly, allowing the Byzantine horsemen to move away from the threat of the archers.
The Battle of Rome
It was their very success in these skirmishes that was to be the undoing of the Byzantines. The troops began to put pressure on Belisarius as they now believed that they could beat the Goths in an open battle. At last he agreed, yet he wanted the battle to be fought on his terms. Therefore he continued with the stratagem of sallies as detailed above, hoping for an opportunity to lead the remainder of his men out and so take the Goths by surprise. The hope did not materialise; the Goths remained vigilant and were always ready for such a move.
Finally, Belisarius abandoned his hopes and gave orders for the troops to deploy for a more traditional, set-piece battle. He sent Valentinus and his men out of the Aurelian Gate on to the Plains of Nero. Their instructions were to harass and pin Marcian and his men in their camp, and not allow any reinforcements to cross the bridge to the east bank of the river. On no account were they to become engaged in a pitched battle.
Belisarius was also faced with the problem of what to do with the Romans. Many of them had volunteered and wanted to fight the Goths. As they were untrained and of dubious quality, they could easily be routed by an enemy attack. Belisarius therefore deployed them through the Pancratian Gate and had them form a dense formation close to the left bank of the river. In this way, these untried troops would help to pin down the Goths whilst not actually being in any danger. Only if Belisarius gave the signal were they to advance and attack the enemy. It was an ingenious way of solving a knotty problem, since any refusal to use them could lead to a drop in their morale with a subsequent refusal to fight in their own defence any longer.
On the east bank, Belisarius had a similar problem. Most of his infantrymen had by now acquired horses captured during the many sorties against the Goths. During the quiet periods of the siege they had been training as cavalrymen and Belisarius now decided that the main effort against the Goth should be fought entirely as a cavalry action. The remnants of the infantry that were without horses, composed of unmounted Isaurians, were to be drawn up near the moat to act as a rallying point behind which the cavalry could reform if they encountered any difficulties.However the morale of the army was high and the infantry were unhappy about being left with such a minor role. Two of Belisarius’ guardsmen, Principius and Tarmatus, argued that the poor showing of the infantry was due to the poor quality of their officers, who ran away as soon as danger threatened. It was not surprising that their men would follow suit. These officers were now mounted and were part of the cavalry arm. Principius and Tarmatus argued that if Belisarius allowed them to lead the infantry, the infantry would fight and not run away. Eventually Belisarius agreed. Leaving a small number of men to guard the gates, the rest of the infantry were deployed to the rear of the cavalry, where they could still act as a rallying point. Yet it was clear that Belisarius did not trust the infantry, since they were deployed in such a way that if they routed, they would not disrupt the ranks of the cavalry as they fled.
The Gothic army deployed in a very traditional manner. In the centre were the ‘heavy-armed
men’, protecting the archers from attack by the Byzantine cavalry. The Gothic cavalry were split fairly evenly between the two flanks. Witigis did, however, order his troops to deploy as far away from the city as possible, lining his men up immediately before the camps. He believed that the sheer size of his army would lead to victory and he wanted the Byzantines to be as far away from the city as possible when they broke. In this way, his men would have more distance in which to pursue the Byzantines before they reached the cover of the walls, and this would enable them to cause the maximum number of casualties. Although Witigis was not of the same calibre as Belisarius, as was seen above in his attempt to emulate Byzantine tactics, it is clear that he did have a grasp of at least some of the basic elements of warfare.