Belisarius: The Last Roman General Page 8

  To counter this, a Byzantine force was brought together, with a large number of troops under the command of their many individual leaders, including Belisarius; Cutzes, one of two duces Phoenices Libanensis (commanders of the troops in Phoenices Libanensis) based at Damascus; and Buzes, the other dux Phoeni ces Libanensis, who was based at Palmyra.

  Here there is a major fault in our sources. This is the battle described by Procopius as taking place at Mindouos (Proc, Wars, I.xiii.2–8). Unfortunately, Procopius appears to have conflated two distinct battles – one at Tanurin and one at Mindouos – into one. Since Tanurin is to the south and Mindouos to the north of Nisibis, it is probably preferable to follow Zacharias Rhetor (Zacharias of Mitylene) and John Malalas and accept that there were two distinct battles. We now, therefore, need to consult Zacharias and Malalas for a clarification of events.

  Zacharias {Historia Ecclesiastica, ix.2) records the battle as follows:

  Accordingly, a Roman army was mustered for the purpose of marching into the desert of Thannuris [Tanurin] against the Persians under the leadership of Belisarius, Cutzes, the brother of Buzes, Basil, Vincent, and other commanders, and Atafar, the chief of the Saracens. And, when the Persians heard of it, they devised a stratagem, and dug several ditches among their trenches, and concealed them all round outside by triangular stakes of wood, and left several openings. And, when the Roman army came up, they did not perceive the Persians’ deceitful stratagem in time, but the generals entered the Persian entrenchment at full speed, and, falling into the pits, were taken prisoners, and Cutzes was killed. And of the Roman army those who were mounted turned back and returned in flight to Dara with Belisarius; but the infantry, who did not escape, were killed and taken captive. And Atafar, the Saracen king, during his flight was struck from a short distance off, and perished; and he was a warlike and an able man, and he had had much experience in the use of Roman arms, and in various places had won distinction and renown in war.

  The description shows a common feature of the warfare of this period – the digging and concealment of trenches and pits. On this occasion, the Byzantines failed to detect the pits in time, and so the infantry were defeated, the cavalry escaping to Dara with Belisarius. It is noteworthy that both Buzes and Cutzes are described by Procopius as being ‘inclined to be rash in engaging with the enemy’ (Proc, Wars, I.xiii.5). It is possible that they were blamed for the defeat, encouraging their soldiers in a rash attack and so falling into the Persian trap. Despite the loss, Belisarius was yet again not blamed for the defeat.

  The same passage in Zacharias (HE, ix.2) is also noteworthy in that it gives us our first glimpse of the personality of Belisarius: ‘Belisarius . . . was not greedy after bribes, and was kind to the peasants, and did not allow the army to injure them. For he was accompanied by Solomon, a eunuch from the fortress of Edribath’. This description of Belisarius’ character is informative. His refusal to take bribes, which implies incorruptibility, his willingness to take advice – in this case from Solomon – and his control of the army are all noteworthy. These are attributes that would stand him in great stead later in his career.

  After this battle Justinian ordered Belisarius to construct a fort at Mindouos, north of Nisibis. The story is again told by Zacharias (HE, ix.5):

  The Romans, when Belisarius was duke ... wished to make a city at Melebasa [Mindouos]; wherefore Gadar the Kadisene was sent with an army by Kavadh; and he prevented the Romans from effecting their purpose, and put them to flight in a battle which he fought with them on the hill of Melebasa.

  Again Belisarius had been defeated. Yet in 529, possibly as a reward for escaping the defeat at Tanurin and the manner of his conduct at Mindouos, Belisarius was recalled and promoted magister militum per Orientem in succession to Hypatius, with instructions to make preparations to invade Persia.

  A large army was now assembled and Belisarius advanced towards his former base at Dara. He was joined by the magister officiorum, Hermogenes, who was to assist in organising the troops, and Rufinus as an ambassador – for already both sides were contemplating peace (Proc., Wars, 1.9–11). There was now a lull in military activities as negotiations began. Although it is not stated specifically in our sources, the time Belisarius now had was probably spent in improving the quality of his army. The army had been dealt a series of defeats at the hands of the Persians. Morale would have been at a very low ebb, and training and discipline in the army appears to have been poor; this is clear from the speech Procopius (Wars, I.xiv.14) has Perozes make to his men before the third day of the battle of Dara:

  But seeing you considering why in the world it is that, although the Romans have not been accustomed heretofore to go into battle without confusion and disorder, they recently awaited the advancing Persians with a kind of order which is by no means characteristic of them, for this reason I have decided to speak some words of exhortation to you

  Although doubtless a literary device to enhance the drama and promote Belisarius’ abilities, there is no doubt a grain of truth in these words. The Persians had won a string of victories over the Byzantines and this would tend to demoralise the Byzantines, making them unwilling to fight and so making their dispositions clumsy and slow.

  It is to Belisarius’ credit that he took steps to train the army and improve morale, for the peace negotiations broke down. Before the conclusion of any treaty, the Persians first wanted to take Dara, which had been a source of resentment since its construction by Anastasius. Accordingly, a Persian army of 30,000 men advanced towards Dara led by Perozes, and set up camp near the town of Ammodius.

  The Sasanid Persian Army

  Although the Sasanid army, like that of the Romans/Byzantines, had also been subject to change over the centuries, this was to a far smaller degree, mainly focusing upon equipment modifications. Following the final overthrow of the Parthians at Firuzabad in 224, many powerful Parthian families had joined the Sasanids. As a consequence, the Sasanid army inherited many of the traditions of the Parthian army, although several details were subject to change.

  Sasanid society was divided into four main groupings, namely: priests, warriors, scribes and commoners. The warrior caste, which included royalty, nobles and the aristocracy, was further divided into three classes based upon rank. The first rank was that of the top seven families in the empire. These were the Sasans themselves, the Aspahbad-Pahlov (from Gurgen, north Persia), the Korin-Pahlov (from Shiraz), the Suren-Pahlov (from Seistan/Sakastan), the Spandiyadh-Pahlov (from Nihawand, near modern Teheran), and the Giuw.

  The second rank were the azadan, or upper nobility. These families could trace their Aryan ancestry back as far as the Achaemenid Empire.

  The first and second classes combined to form the savaran, the elite armoured cavalry. Included in the savaran were some of the elite units of the Sasanid army. For example, there was the Pushtighban (Royal Guards) unit, comprising approximately 1,000 men stationed in Ctesiphon; the Gyan-avspar (Those Who Sacrifice Their Lives), also known as the Peshmerga, formed from men who had distinguished themselves in battle; and the Zhayedan (Immortals) unit, comprising 10,000 men, emulating the Immortals of Darius the Great.

  The third rank of the warrior class were the dekhans, or lower nobility. Unable to enter the savaran, these warriors formed the core of the Sasanids’ light horse archers.

  The image of Sasanid infantry is dominated by the paighan, or conscript infantry. Equipped with a spear and large shield, their low morale and poor quality is seen to typify the plight of Sasanid foot troops. Their task was to serve as pages to the savaran, assault fortifications, excavate siege mines, and look after the baggage train. It is true that they were available in huge numbers; the Chromnion Anonymum (66.203.20–205.7) depicts an army led by Khusrow I consisting of 183,000 troops. Of these, 120,000 are paighan. Yet 40,000 of the total are other Sasanid infantry, with the balance being cavalry.

  A major source of foot warriors were the native Medes. Mede infantry could be armed with spear, shi
eld, chain mail and ridge helmets; these were highly regarded and could even be deployed in the centre of the battle line behind the savaran. A further source of recruits was the Dailamites. These may have been armed with a mixture of weapons, including battleaxes, bows, slings, and daggers, but Agathias (3.7-9) describes them as carrying ‘both long and short spears [sarissai and xysta] ... and a sword slung across one shoulder’. Apparently capable of both skirmishing and close combat, they were an infantry force respected even by the Byzantines.

  A large proportion of the infantry force which may have been classed as part of the paighan, but which were highly regarded by the Sasanids, were the foot archers. They were armed with the traditional composite bow and, when possible, with a large shield. In attack they were used to disrupt enemy formations prior to the savaran’s assault; in defence they were to disrupt, or even halt, enemy attacks.

  Allies and Mercenaries

  Alongside the native troops were the allies and mercenaries who were used to supplement the army. The Armenians supplied both cavalry and infantry to the Sasanid army and were highly regarded by them. The elite Armenian cavalry were trained and equipped as the savaran and were considered their equal. The remainder of the cavalry joined the light horse archers. The Armenian infantry, armed with spear and sling, were also well respected by the Sasanids and boosted the overall quality of the infantry forces available.

  Finally, there were the troops supplied by, for example, the Lakhmids, Alans, Kushans, Saka and Hepthalites. Mainly composed of light horse armed with bows and/or javelins, when combined with the Sasanid light horse archers they made formidable opponents.

  Although most allies provided light horse troops, the exception was the Lakhmids. An Arab tribe, the Lakhmids were very highly rated, and, like the Armenians, their cavalry was trained and equipped to fight alongside the savaran. They were a major ally, assisting the Sasanids in their wars with the Byzantines and helping to neutralise the threat of the Ghassanids, an Arab tribe allied to the Byzantines.

  Elephants

  One major difference between the Byzantines and the Sasanids was the latter’s use of the war elephant. Imported from India, the elephant was guided by a trained mahout, who sat astride its neck, and a turret-like howdah carrying two or three warriors armed with bows or javelins strapped to its back. The elephant had three functions. One was to provide a missile platform, allowing the archers in the howdah to rain arrows on the enemy from a higher vantage point affording greater vision to the archers and partly negating the enemy’s use of shields for protection. The second was to cause fear and consternation to the enemy. Much has been made of the fear the elephant inspires in horses unused to their presence, yet the sight of such a large creature bearing down would also have been terrifying for enemy foot soldiers. Third, the elephant was capable of smashing into enemy troops and causing widespread death and chaos, which could then be exploited by supporting troops. In order to help the process, it was common to give the elephants alcohol prior to battle. This would aid in making the elephant aggressive, helping to override the serene instincts of an otherwise relatively peaceful creature. In theory, and many times in practice, the elephant could be a battle-winning weapon.

  Unfortunately, the theory did not always work in the field. Elephants, like most animals, do not like the noise, confusion and pain found on battlefields, and were therefore liable to become uncontrollable – on more than one occasion turning away from the enemy and running back through their own troops, killing and disordering them as they went.

  The double-edged nature of the elephant resulted in it always being a risky weapon to use, and it is noticeable that the Byzantines – ever willing to adopt successful enemy weapons – did not maintain any war elephants for their own use, except in the games. They were rarely used in the wars against the Byzantines.

  Organization

  In the main, it would appear that the Sasanids organised their own troops – at least their cavalry, if not necessarily their infantry or the allied troops – using a decimal system, although it must be admitted that the evidence is sparse. The smallest unit mentioned was the vasht. Although no figure is given for the size of this formation, earlier practice would suggest a strength of approximately 100 men. A larger unit was the drafsh, which appears to have numbered around 1,000 men. Finally, the largest division was the gund, probably of about 10,000 men.

  Although based mainly upon deduction and previous practice, support is given to the theory by the fact that armies were usually stated to have had around 10,000 men, led by a gund-salar (general). If we allow for a personal bodyguard of up to 2,000 men, the general might have a total of around 12,000 troops. However, in the field the numbers would have varied due to disease/ illness, injury or any of the other factors that could reduce unit rosters. Also, it should be borne in mind that historians such as Procopius tended to give round figures, meaning that anywhere between around 8,000 to around 12,000 may have been rounded to 10,000, therefore this hypothesis should be treated with caution.

  Leadership

  A full muster of the standing army, or spah, could be led by the king or, more rarely, by his deputy, the vuzurg-framandar (great commander). In the main, however, the command of the army usually fell to the eran-spahbad, who was usually a member of one of the seven top families. If he was unavailable to lead an army, or the army was simply a small defensive force, command could devolve upon the spahbad or the marzban. These both combined the roles of general and local governor, though only the spahbad appears to have been given the power to conduct formal negotiations.

  The total strength of the Sasanid army in the late sixth century has been estimated at approximately 70,000 troops. If this is accurate, then there may have been four gund, each of around 12,000 men, with a seperate field army of approximately 22,000 men – including the 10,000 Zhayedan, the 1,000 pushtighban, the gyan-avspar and other guard units – being called to muster in Ctesiphon, under the command of the king, should the need arise.

  Defensive Equipment

  Helmets

  Helmets were similar in form to those worn by the Byzantines, both having derived from the same Iranian and steppe originals. They included ridge helmets and spangenhelms, with the addition of chain mail hanging from the rims of the helmets as further protection to the head, neck and face. The main stylistic difference was that in the bashlyk type of spangenhelm, the bowl formed a higher peak than in the Byzantine variants, possibly to aid in the deflection of vertical blows to the head.

  Like Byzantine helmets, all of these could be overlaid with gold and/or silver or be tinned, and have semi-precious stones attached to improve appearance.

  Armour

  Again, the armour worn was similar – if not identical – in style to the types worn by the Byzantines. This included lamellar, scale and chain mail armour. However, unlike the Byzantines, it appears that the Sasanids commonly combined the various types into one piece of armour, designed to utilise the best properties of each type to cover the most appropriate area of the body. As a consequence, a savaran horseman may have worn chain mail overlaid with lamellar armour to give extra protection to the torso, coupled with laminated defences for the arms and legs. He may also have worn a bazpan (armoured glove) to protect one or both hands.

  However, probably due to the cost and complexity of manufacturing such complex armour, plain mail seems to have been slowly becoming the norm for the Sasanid army.

  Shields

  The spearmen of the paighan infantry, and on occasion the foot archers, carried a large oblong, curved shield made from wicker and rawhide. The Dailami infantry are described by Agathias (3.7–9) as carrying shields and bucklers. This suggests a mix of types according to personal preference, but possibly tending towards a smaller, round type that could be used for skirmishing. However, it should be noted that Agathias describes these troops as being capable of both skirmishing and fighting at close quarters, so the evidence is not conclusive.

  On the wh
ole, the Sasanid horse archers did not carry any shields, relying upon the speed of their mounts to evade the enemy; but some of the allied cavalry contingents, such as the Alans, did carry a form of small buckler to enable them to compete in hand-to-hand combat. It may have been this that motivated the savaran to begin wearing a small buckler attached to the left forearm to help protect them when in battle. Yet this may also tie in to a change in outlook for the Sasanid heavy cavalry.

  Horse Armour

  The heavy defences of the earlier period of the Sasanid Empire were now in decline, possibly as a result of their experience fighting enemies such as the Huns and Hepthalites, who relied on mobility and firepower. The complete covering for horses found, for example, at Dura Europos, were being replaced by a chamfron (head) and crinet (neck) covering that protected only the head, neck and frontal chest areas of the horse. This marks part of the transformation of the savaran back into a force relying on archery followed by momentum and mobility to break the enemy, rather than simply their close-formation charge. Yet even these may have been in decline.