Belisarius: The Last Roman General Read online

  Gelimer was a great-grandson of Gaiseric, and, as the second-eldest male descendant of Gaiseric, he was nominally next in line to the throne after Hilderic: Geiseric had arranged matters so that his eldest male descendant would ascend the throne in order to avoid the troubles that plagued direct succession, such as minorities and guardianships.

  Following his appointment by Hilderic as commander of the army, Gelimer defeated the Moors in battle and then opened negotiations for an alliance. However, Gelimer was worried by the political course that Hilderic was following. He believed that Hilderic’s apparent subservience to the emperor might result in his losing his standing as next in line to the throne. After his victory had enhanced his military reputation and increased his power base, he increasingly opposed the policies followed by Hilderic. Eventually, he began to claim that Hilderic was too weak and unwarlike to rule the nation and, almost inevitably, in May 530 Gelimer revolted with the general support of the Vandal nobles. Hilderic and his principal followers were imprisoned and Gelimer assumed power.

  Upon coming to power, Gelimer attempted to establish positive political relations with his neighbours. He sent gifts to Justinian, who refused to accept them or to recognise Gelimer. Gelimer may also have attempted to open negotiations with the Goths in Italy, but this was anticipated by Justinian, who sent word to Ravenna advising that they not recognise Gelimer. At this time, not long after King Theoderic’s death, King Athalaric was a minor and his mother, Amalasuintha, was acting as regent. Niece of the murdered Amalafrida, she was also keen to secure Justinian’s support for herself and her son. Any embassies from Gelimer were rebuffed.

  Justinian now sent two embassies to Gelimer. In the first, he criticised Gelimer for rebelling, in the second he threatened war if Gelimer did not release Hilderic and other captives and allow them to travel to Constantinople. However, the chances of Gelimer releasing Hilderic were practically non-existent; it would destabilise his position if the ‘true’ king was in exile and available to return to cast out the usurper. Hilderic was retained in prison. At no point would Gelimer have seriously contemplated that the Empire would launch an attack upon Africa.

  With his political overtures rejected, internal affairs now began to go awry for Gelimer. Although he had the reputation of an outstanding military leader, he was seen by many of his contemporaries as clever and unscrupulous. If Gelimer had remained above reproach in his personal dealings, he may have survived. Unfortunately, he quickly gained a reputation for greed, employing Bonifatius, a native from Byzacium, as a secretary. Perhaps with a background in Roman law, Bonifatius was used by Gelimer to seize the property of his enemies. Furthermore, Gelimer was now alleged to have executed many of the nobility. Support for Gelimer began to weaken, and it is in this context that the rebellions in Tripolitania and Sardinia took place.

  The rebellions that occurred within the Vandal kingdom immediately prior to the Byzantine attack are generally perceived as a series of unconnected events that coincidentally conspired in Justinian’s favour. In Tripoli, a citizen named Pudentius began an insurrection against Vandal rule and requested imperial assistance. Furthermore, Gelimer had given control of Sardinia to a man named Godas, said by Procopius to be a personal slave. Godas was ambitious enough to assume the role of an independent commander, but astute enough to realise that he needed outside support to maintain his independence. He quickly began negotiations with Justinian for aid.

  Some aspects of the story need examination. That two important areas under Vandal control should rebel within a short space of time of each other is reasonable; after all, they had a king that had taken control by force, who was unlikely to be welcomed by everyone and who quickly obtained a reputation for unscrupulous behaviour. Yet these events occurred long after Gelimer assumed power and almost simultaneously with Justinian’s planned invasion. The timing needs explanation.

  It is reasonable to assume that both parties had been in touch with Justinian prior to their rebellion in an attempt to secure Byzantine support. It is likely that they both waited until Justinian was prepared to send aid before acting, since on their own they would be overwhelmed by Gelimer’s response. Justinian would not be in a position to send assistance until 533. First he had to arrange peace on the eastern front in order to release the troops needed for the assault on Vandal Africa, and then he had to suppress the Nika revolt in Constantinople.

  With such a long lapse of time, the evidence points to the timing of the rebellions being orchestrated from Constantinople: in short, Justinian was exercising his diplomatic talents and pulling the strings behind the scenes. This was due to the fact that once Gelimer had refused his demands to release Hilderic, Justinian had been busy politically. Recognising the Vandals’ political isolation, Justinian realised that there was a chance to attack the Vandals before Gelimer could consolidate his position. Furthermore, it is likely that by this time he had received messengers from Godas in Sardinia and Pudentius in Tripolitania asking for his support in their prospective rebellions.

  Justinian began to make the necessary diplomatic moves. He needed the support of the Goths, since they ruled the territories between Constantinople and Africa. Without them, Sicily would not be available as a base and the expedition would find it difficult to assault Africa with the necessary logistical support. However, it would be relatively easy to gain their assistance. As was noted earlier, the regent Amalasuintha had a personal enmity with the Vandals and was keen to cultivate the friendship of Justinian. She now gave her consent to the expedition landing in Sicily, further agreeing to establish a market in Syracuse where the Byzantines could buy provisions and horses.

  With the western routes to Africa secure, the other major concern was the Persian frontier. It would be almost impossible to fight a war on two fronts. At war since 527, Justinian looked to his generals to act decisively. When Belisarius won the Battle of Dara in 530, Justinian must have hoped that peace could be achieved. Unfortunately, the loss at Callinicum in 531 postponed hopes of a secure frontier, but the death of Kavadh and the accession of Khusrow altered the balance of power. After extensive negotiations and threats, Kavadh signed the ‘Endless Peace’ in 532, Justinian agreeing to withdraw the headquarters of the dux Mesopotamiae from Dara to Constantina, and pay 11,000 pounds of gold, amongst other conditions. Seen by some as an expensive peace, it nevertheless freed troops and reduced pressure on the eastern front. Justinian was now free to act against the Vandal usurper.

  Throughout the existence of the Vandal kingdom there had been pleas for help from the native Catholics. Justinian could now use their pleas for help as a further justification for action, alongside his determination to punish the Vandal king that had defied him. With his clear grounds for attack, coupled with the Vandals’ untrustworthy behaviour, Justinian had gained the support or neutrality of the kingdoms surrounding the Vandals. With the ‘Endless Peace’ in place he now had troops free with which to mount the attack. With his support there would be rebellion within the Vandal kingdom. The time had arrived for action.

  It is notable that few indications are given by Procopius of any of these diplomatic manoeuvres. This is not a surprise. To safeguard the individuals plotting rebellion, details of the negotiations would be restricted to the few individuals who were involved in the plots. To ensure that the Vandals were unaware of the proposed landings in Africa, the diplomatic talks would need to remain as secretive as possible. It is not surprising that Procopius does not mention any of the diplomatic activity; he would certainly not have been privileged with such information. As a further point, with his intense dislike and contempt for Justinian – as revealed in Anekdota - it is improbable that he would have believed the emperor capable of such subtle political manoeuvring.

  When Justinian revealed his purpose in council, the expedition was not greeted with enthusiasm by the emperor’s advisors. Mindful of the disasters which had befallen the two previous attempts by the Empire to regain Africa, and frightened by the military prest
ige still attached to the Vandals, none of the military commanders wanted to be the one ordered across the ocean to Africa, the leader of the expedition not yet having been announced. Furthermore, John the Cappadocian and other financial advisors advised Justinian that the war would be too costly for the empire’s now-limited resources. According to Procopius, at this point the emperor himself began to waver in his resolve, but a bishop reported a dream in which God had promised to help Justinian in the capture of Africa. Upon hearing this, Justinian regained his enthusiasm and announced the leader of the expedition (Proc, Wars, III.x.1-22).

  Belisarius appointed commander

  With everything ready for the invasion, all that was needed was a commander for the operation. Mundus, the magister militum per Orientem was reappointed magister militum per Illyricum in January 532. It is possible that at this time Belisarius was once again made magister militum per Orientem, although the actual dating of his appointment is obscure; he was definitely filling the post by February 533.

  The choice of Belisarius has always been seen as obvious: he had proven himself in the Persian Wars by his superb generalship, he was a personal friend of the emperor, and he had recently proven his loyalty in the Nika Riots. Assured of victory due to his military gifts, he would not then rebel and set himself up as a rival to Justinian in Africa.

  None of this makes sense. In Chapter 4 it was shown that Belisarius had lost the early, unnamed battle in Armenia, had been present for the defeat at the Battle of Tanurin, and had commanded at the battles of Mindouos and Callinicum, two further defeats. The only battle he had won was at Dara. Although this had been a superb victory won by outstanding generalship, the winning of one battle and the loss of four – although admittedly he may not have been in charge at two of them – does not indicate superior military ability.

  Yet despite his defeats at the hands of the Persians, Belisarius had recently been cleared of incompetence by the inquiry led by Constantiolus. His conduct at Dara had shown that he did have considerable talent, although this was not always in evidence, so the potential for victory was there.

  His friendship and loyalty to Justinian are beyond question, but again on their own they do not justify Justinian’s decision to send Belisarius to the west. There must have been more to Justinian’s choice of commander.

  The reasons can be found in evidence regarding Belisarius that has already been seen. One of the major reasons for the choice of Belisarius was linguistic. Most of the generals of the eastern empire now spoke Greek rather than Latin: the population of Africa spoke Latin. Although it would be possible to provide a translator for a Greek-speaking general, and although it is probable that most senior generals had been taught Latin, a ‘native’ speaker such as Belisarius would have been the preferred choice, since he was less likely to antagonise the native Africans either by his attitude or by misinterpreting their language. Furthermore, Justinian was aware that western Latin speakers believed that Greek-speaking easterners were effete, untrustworthy Greeks. This made the Latin-speaking ‘westerner’ Belisarius – born in Germana , in or near Illyricum, a ‘western’ province – an obvious choice.

  As a final confirmation of his suitability, there is the passage from Zacharias previously quoted, showing that Belisarius ‘was not greedy after bribes, and was kind to the peasants, and did not allow the army to injure them.’ The last thing Justinian would want would be to conquer the Vandals only to have the native Africans rise in revolt due to the troops being arrogant and treating them poorly; the idea was to conquer, not to have to repeatedly send troops to crush unrest.

  Taking everything into account, there is unlikely to have been any other general in the service of Justinian who was as suitable as Belisarius to wage war in the west: the reinstated magister militum per Orientem would lead the expedition to Africa.

  Preparation and Departure

  In 533 Belisarius was officially given supreme command of the expedition. There was to be no dual command, as had been used in the east; Belisarius was in sole control, with the emperor confirming his position in writing. In order to reduce the burden of command, Justinian appointed Archelaus, a man with great experience who had previously been praetorian prefect of Byzantium and Illyricum, as prefect of the army and so in charge of the logistics

  Justinian placed at Belisarius’ disposal a mixed force of infantry and cavalry. According to Procopius (Proc, Wars, III.xi.1–21), the main force was composed of 5,000 Byzantine cavalry under the command of Rufinus, Aigan, Barbatus and Pappus, and 10,000 infantry, under the overall command of John, a native of Epidamnus/Dyrrachium, supported by Theodorus Cteanus, Terentius Zaidus, Marcian and Sarapis. A further element was a contingent oi foederati led by Dorotheus (magister militum per Armemam) and Solomon, Belisarius’ domestic™.

  Included amongst the generals were Cyprian, Valerian, Martinus, Althias, John and Marcellus. At about this time Justinian received a reply from the Vandal rebel, Godas, in Sardinia, stating that the troops would be welcome but that there was no need to send a commander. As a consequence, Cyril, one of the leaders of the foederati, was appointed to lead the expedition to Sardinia along with 400 men and was ordered to sail with Belisarius. Unfortunately, we are given no clear indication by Procopius as to whether the 400 men sent to aid Godas were included in Procopius’ overall total for Belisarius’ army or were an additional number of men.

  Finally, there were two groups of mercenaries: 400 Heruls under Pharas and 600 Huns under Sinnion and Balas – the latter two being praised as men ‘endowed with bravery and endurance’ (Proc, Wars, III.xi.13.)

  Serving alongside Belisarius were his personal comitatus, including spearmen, guardsmen and his bucellarn. Procopius does not appear to have included either the comitatus or the mercenaries as part of the total of 15,000 men, so it is possible that Belisarius’ force amounted to at least 17,000 troops.

  To carry the expedition 500 ships were gathered, varying in size between approximately 30 and 500 tons, being crewed by an additional 30,000 sailors (averaging sixty men per ship), mainly natives of Egypt, Ionia and Cilicia, with Calonymus of Alexandria as commander. To defend the transports, ninety-two dromones (literally ‘runners’: single-banked warships with decks covering the rowers) were prepared, with 2,000 marines to man them alongside their normal crew.

  When taken together, the traditional view that Belisarius set sail with only 15,000 troops to conquer Africa does not appear to be correct. Certainly, the main body was the 15,000 men detailed by Procopius as being allocated to Belisarius, but the expedition also included 400 Heruls, 600 Huns, Belisarius’ personal comitatus, and 2,000 sailors ‘from Constantinople’ manning the warships, who had been trained to fight as well as row (Proc, Wars, III.xi.16). There is also confusion over whether the foederati and Cyril’s force of 400 men were included in the original total. Finally, there were 30,000 sailors. Even if we accept that the sailors on the transport vessels would not be very good as warriors and therefore do not add them to the total, this still leaves a force probably in the region of twenty thousand men. The equivalent of two old Roman legions plus auxilia, even in the earlier empire this would have been a force to be reckoned with. In 9AD Varus had lost three legions in the Teutoburgerwald, rated as one of the worst disasters in Roman military history. The invasion was not undermanned, nor was it a scratch force scraped together for a desperate adventure. It was a large, well-balanced force capable of overcoming the Vandals and may have contained a higher proportion of high quality, reliable troops than the armies stationed in the east.

  Whilst the force was equipped along the lines of Byzantine forces as outlined in Chapter 3, there was a major difference between this army and that used by Belisarius at Dara and Callinicum: there was no opportunity to train the troops before departure. As we shall see, Belisarius would be forced by the weather to stop en route to Africa and this would allow him to organise the command structure, but at no point was he able to give the troops practice of working together as a
unit. This was to have repercussions later.

  The Invasion of Africa

  In June 533 Belisarius and the army embarked at Constantinople and set sail, Belisarius being accompanied by his wife Antonina and his assessor and secretary Procopius.

  The fleet sailed from Constantinople to Heraclea Perinthus (Eregli, on the Sea of Marmara), where they waited five days for the arrival of a large number of horses from the Thracian herds. They then moved to Abydos, where they were becalmed for four days. During their enforced stay, Belisarius reinforced his authority when two drunken Huns killed a colleague. The two were executed and a message sent to the army that Belisarius was in charge and discipline would be enforced (Proc, Wars, III.xii.7-22).

  Whilst in Abydos measures were taken to ensure that the fleet would not become dispersed in bad weather. The three ships in which Belisarius and his staff sailed were marked out so that they were easy to locate. They had a portion of their sails painted red and lanterns erected to make them visible both day and night (Proc, Wars, III.xiii.1–4).

  Once the wind strengthened, the fleet proceeded to first Sigeum, then across the Aegean to Malea.

  From there they went to Taenarum (Caenopolis: Cape Matapan) and finally to Methone. Here the army was joined by Valerian and Martinus along with a further contingent of troops – how many we are not told – and, due to the lack of wind, Belisarius decided to disembark the troops. This done, he formed up the army and organised his forces, detailing which troops were under the command of which officers. This would have been a very necessary requirement; with so many officers it would be easy for there to be confusion over command of the various troops and Belisarius averted the possible chaos that may have ensued upon landing in Africa.