Belisarius: The Last Roman General Read online

  Weapons

  Lances and Spears

  The lances used by the savaran, and the spears used by some allied cavalry and the infantry, are likely to have resembled those used by the Byzantine cavalry of the same period. Unfortunately, none have survived to enable us to have a clear picture of their appearance, although depictions in art such as the basreliefs at Firzubad and Naghsh-e-Rustam give us some idea of their length and thickness, and the manner of their use.

  As noted above, the Dailami troops are described by Agathias (3.7–9) as armed with ‘both long and short spears’.

  Swords

  The swords used by the Sasanids appear to have been long and relatively heavy, being 1–1.11m in length and between 5 and 8.5cm in width. Unfortunately, excavated examples have been too corroded to allow a full reconstruction, so it is impossible to decide if they were designed mainly for either cutting or thrusting. However, there is a possible clue in the distinctive angled grip. This is very similar to the ’semi-pistol’ grip of the British 1908 pattern cavalry sword, which is generally considered the best sword ever issued to the British cavalry. This is partly because the 1908 sword was optimized purely for thrusting. The angle of the grip ensured that when the arm was extended, the blade naturally aligned with it, so there was a straight line from sword point to shoulder. As a consequence, when charging the sword was positioned to allow the rider to use the point at speed, effectively like a lance thrust, transmitting the full momentum of the horse into the blow; although this is not to say that it was not possible to cut with it too. It is worthy of comment that the Sasanids had the curved grip fifteen centuries before British sword makers, after a long drawn-out process and scientific study, arrived back at essentially the same solution.

  Other close combat weapons

  Maces, axes and whips could also be used by the cavalry, as well as the infantry, in a Sasanid army. Whilst the use of maces, axes and spears needs no explanation, it is likely that the whip was used in a similar manner to the Hunnic lasso. Whilst it could inflict wounds that were not lethal, its main function may have been to entangle the opponent and unbalance him, so enabling the warrior to dispatch him with relative ease.

  Bows

  Archery was returning to favour, as has been noted above, mainly due to the impact of groups such as the Huns and the Hepthalites. The Sasanid bow was of standard Central Asian composite design, and was employed by the majority of the cavalry as well as a proportion of the foot soldiers.

  Sasanid archery relied on four factors for success: penetrative power, speed of delivery, volume of arrows and accuracy. The emphasis upon speed and concentrated volume in a small area is highlighted by a Persian device, the panjagon (‘five device’). This machine allowed five arrows to be fired with one draw, which, although not particularly accurate, did allow for a very large number of arrows to land simultaneously in a relatively small space. Unfortunately, none of these weapons has survived, so it has been impossible to replicate one and conduct experiments to establish how accurate the device was or measure the force and penetrating power of its arrows.

  Siege Equipment:

  Unlike the Parthians, the Sasanids learnt the art of siege warfare, probably from the Romans/Byzantines. To this end, they used the same type of siege equipment as the Byzantines. Although it is unlikely that they could greatly improve upon the Byzantine designs or methods, they soon came to match them in their skills in both the assault of fortifications and their defence.

  Such, then, was the army with which Peroz now threatened Dara.

  The Battle of Dara

  The clash at Dara highlights one of Belisarius’ favourite tactics when fighting a battle. He was primarily a defensive commander, a theme that we will return to throughout the course of the book.

  Roman/Byzantine battles against the Persians were historically fraught with danger. The high mobility of the Persian cavalry, and their resultant ability to control the battlefield, had only been partly offset by the previously-mentioned changes taking place within the Byzantine army – especially the greater reliance upon cavalry. The result of their tactical dominance had been their battlefield superiority in the preceding century. Belisarius was aware of this difficulty and he employed the time-honoured tactic of digging ditches to help compensate for his disadvantage, as shown in the diagram.

  Yet the arrangement of the ditches suggests more; it is difficult to impose your will upon the enemy when they have the greater mobility, but Belisarius wanted to guide the battle towards a specific series of events. Therefore, the ditches were dug to a particular layout in the expectation of these events unfolding. In effect, the centre was advanced and the wings refused. Belisarius engineered events so that the main strike would occur on the flanks.

  Stationed behind the front trench were the infantry, with a reserve of cavalry, under Belisarius and Hermogenes. Echeloned back and to the left of the infantry and positioned behind the ditches were Buzes with some Byzantine cavalry and Pharas the Herulian with 300 Herulian cavalry. To the right of these, stationed behind the infantry and so out of sight of the Persians, were Sunicas and Aigan with 600 cavalry. The right wing mirrored the left: a large force of Byzantine cavalry was stationed on the right behind the ditches, and behind the infantry to their left were Simmas and Ascan with 600 cavalry.

  The plan appears to have been simple: the Persian wings would advance and slowly force back the relatively-weak Byzantine cavalry, with the ditches helping to keep the Persian advance at a slow pace. Once they had advanced past the reserve cavalry units stationed behind the infantry, these would be able to attack the Persian cavalry in the flank and rear, hopefully causing them to panic and rout. The task of the infantry was to maintain their position and pin the enemy centre.

  As the Persians approached, their leader, Perozes (described by Procopius as mirranes, possibly equating to the marzban of the Persian army) sent a message to Belisarius to prepare a bath for his arrival. Belisarius ignored the message, but ensured that all was prepared for battle the following day.

  On the morning of the next day, both sides drew up in their battle formations, the Byzantines as described above and the Persians in deep formations, then stopped. Both armies waited. The Persians believed that if they waited until after noon, the Byzantine troops, who usually ate before noon, would be hungry and weaker, so would in all likelihood give way. The Persians, who traditionally ate later in the day, would then prove to be the stronger. Therefore it was not until the afternoon that a force of Persian cavalry on their right wing attacked the troops with Buzes and Pharas. The Byzantines retired a short distance to their rear, but the Persians – possibly sensing a trap – refused to pursue. Consequently the Byzantines advanced again and forced the Persians to retire in their turn.

  Shortly after, there was a challenge to single combat by a Persian youth, who was killed by Andreas, a trainer in a wrestling school. A further challenger was also killed by Andreas, before the armies retired to camp for the night.

  On the second day, the respective generals realised that any attempt at battle was hazardous given the equality of forces and so they exchanged letters in an attempt to entice either the enemy to withdraw or to accept battle at a disadvantage. The attempt failed.

  By the third day Perozes had been reinforced by 10,000 men and, with his numerical superiority assured, the Persian army prepared for battle. Perozes divided his army in two, forming two parallel lines, each formed of an infantry centre flanked by cavalry. The 10,000 men of the Zhayedan (Immortals), he stationed in reserve behind both lines. The idea was to rotate the front and back lines, enabling tired troops to have a rest whilst still keeping the Byzantines under intense pressure. Perozes himself controlled the centre, with Pity axes on the right with the Cadiseni, and Baresmanas on the left.

  However it was also on the third day that Pharas, the leader of the Heruls, suggested a small alteration in the Byzantine plan. He proposed that he lead his Heruls behind the hill on the left flank, the
n, when the enemy were fully engaged, he would lead them over the hill and strike the Persians in the rear. Belisarius and Hermogenes approved the plan, and the cavalry under Buzes expanded their frontage to cover the gap this created, thus ensuring the Persians did not detect that part of the cavalry force was now missing from its place in the line.

  After again waiting until the afternoon, the Persians finally closed the distance between the armies and an exchange of missiles began. The advantage that the Persians had with more men and their rotation system – which went unnoticed by the Byzantines – was offset by them firing against the wind. Once the supply of missiles was exhausted, the cavalry of the Persian right wing advanced to contact.

  After fierce fighting, the Byzantine left was driven back and was beginning to give way when the Heruls under Pharas appeared over the crest of the hill and charged into the flank and rear of the advancing Persians. As Pityaxes’ men wavered, Sunicas and Aigan with their 600 men attacked them in the other flank. The Persians broke and fled back to the shelter of their infantry, leaving 3,000 dead behind them.

  Meanwhile, Perozes reinforced his left flank with some troops drawn from the second line and the Zhayedan in preparation for an assault on the Byzantine right wing. Fortunately, this was seen by Belisarius and Hermogenes and they accordingly ordered some of their own reserves, plus the troops under Sunicas and Aigan, to join Simmas and Ascan, sheltering behind the infantry on the right flank.

  When this second Persian onslaught struck, the Byzantine right wing recoiled. This exposed the flank of the attackers, which the newly-combined troops attacked, driving through the Persians and splitting the Persian army in two. As the Persian wing turned to meet the attack, the recoiling Byzantines rallied and charged. Sunicas killed Baresmanas and the Persian left wing, attacked from two directions, was surrounded, 5,000 men being killed.

  At this point, the Persian centre threw down its arms and fled, closely followed by the remnants of the right flank. Many were killed in the ensuing pursuit, but Belisarius and Hermogenes did not allow the chase to continue for long. The Persians were renowned for their ability to recover from a rout and turn upon their pursuers: Belisarius did not want to lose a battle that had already been won.

  This was not the end of the fighting. After the battle, the Persians sent an army into Armenia. Surprised by the forces of Dorotheus, the newly-created magister militum per Armeniam, and Sittas, magister utriusque militum praesentalis, the army was defeated and returned to Persarmenia. Reinforced, the Persians returned and at the Battle of Satala they were again defeated by Dorotheus and Sittas. Finally, Byzantine forces completed the conquest of the Tzani, and the brothers Narses and Aratius, who had earlier defeated Belisarius in battle, deserted to the Byzantines, followed by a third brother, Isaac, who also delivered the fortress of Bolum into Byzantine hands.

  At about this time a brief glimpse is given into international politics. The Samaritans, unhappy at Byzantine rule, had previously been defeated in their revolt against the empire. In late 530, five Samaritans were captured in the vicinity of Ammodius, and when questioned under torture they revealed to Belisarius that there had been a plan to betray Palestine to Kavadh. Although unsuccessful, this illustrates the sometimes complex character of politics in the Middle East in the sixth century.

  The Battle of Callinicum

  In the Spring of 531 the Persians again invaded Byzantine territory. Yet this time there were to be major differences from previous campaigns. Following the advice of the Lakhmid commander Al-Mundhir (Proc, Wars, I.xvii.29–40), the Persians under the spahbad, Azarethes, invaded Commagene/Euphratensis (see Map 4). Procopius states that this was the first time that there had ever been an attack from this direction by the Persians (Proc, Wars, I.xvii.2–3 and I.xviii.3). Furthermore, Al-Mundhir himself accompanied the invasion, along with 5,000 of his troops. When deployed alongside the 10,000 Persian cavalry, the result was that Azarethes fielded an all-mounted army of 15,000 troops.

  Caught by surprise, Belisarius at first hesitated in case this was a diversion, and he was unsure what to do about the defence of the traditional line of Persian attack. Eventually, he left garrisons in the cities of Mesopotamia and crossed the Euphrates to challenge the Persians, employing forced marches to catch the enemy. He had also been politically active and had obtained the services of 5,000 Ghassanid troops under Arethas. This gave him a total of 25,000 troops, both infantry and cavalry. Having made contact with the Persians, who had been busy pillaging the countryside, he set up camp at Chalcis, whilst the Persians were in the vicinity of Gabbula.

  Faced with a superior force, Azarethes began to retire towards the Persian frontier. Belisarius followed a day’s march behind, often using the deserted Persian camps of the day before to billet his troops. He finally caught up with the Persians in the vicinity of Callinicum on the day before Easter Day, 531.

  According to Procopius, there was now a disagreement between Belisarius and his men. Belisarius did not want to give battle as to fight on Easter Day was disrespectful to God. Furthermore, his men would be required by their religion to fast on the day of the battle, leaving them weak and easily exhausted. However, the troops did want to fight and Belisarius eventually yielded to their wishes. The battle would be fought on Easter Day, 19 April 531.

  The dispositions of the troops conformed to the terrain. As the Byzantines approached the battlefield, the River Euphrates ran along their left side, protecting that flank from attack. On the right the ground rose sharply. Therefore, Belisarius deployed his infantry, under the command of Peter, a soldier in the bodyguard of Justinian, with their left flank on the river. He personally took command of the centre of the line with the cavalry, whilst to his right were the Huns under Simmas and Sunicas. To their right was a further force of Byzantine cavalry under Ascan, followed by a body of Lycaonian infantry under the command of Longinus and Stephanacius. On the right flank, where the ground rose, he stationed the Ghassanids under Arethas.

  On the Persian side, Azarethes stationed his cavalry opposite the Byzantines, with the Lakhmids on his left facing the Ghassanids.

  There was now an extensive missile exchange. Although the Persians fired a greater number of arrows, the majority of these were stopped by the Byzantine armour (Procopius, Wars, I.xviii.33). In contrast, the smaller number of Byzantine arrows had greater penetrative power, so the outcome was evenly balanced.

  Towards the end of the exchange, Azarethes moved a large number of his cavalry to his left wing, stationing them alongside the Lakhmids. This was to prove critical; a similar move at Dara had been observed by the Byzantines and they had taken measures to counter the attack. This time, the move went unobserved and the attack proved decisive as, not being reinforced, the Byzantine right wing crumbled. The Ghassanids were put to rout, followed by the Lycaonians – Longinus and Stephanacius both being killed. The Byzantine cavalry on the right appear to have resisted, but it was to no avail, with Ascan also being killed in the fighting. Pressure now mounted upon the remainder of the Byzantine line until the rest of the cavalry fled, leaving only the Byzantine infantry to face the Persians. The infantry adopted the fulcum formation, the later equivalent of the famous testudo (tortoise), used to defend against heavy missile attacks. They formed up in a ‘U’-shape, using the river to close the top of the ‘U’. With foot archers in the centre of the ‘U’ giving overhead supporting fire, the infantry withstood the Persian attack until nightfall, when they escaped over the Euphrates to safety in Callinicum.

  It is at the point, where the battle comes to the infantry, that there is confusion in the sources. Procopius has Belisarius retiring to the infantry, giving up his horse and fighting alongside them until nightfall (Proc, Wars, I.xviii.43). According to Malalas, Belisarius did not remain, but fled earlier in the battle, escaping by boat across the river. In this version, Sunicas and Simmas were the ones who dismounted with their troops to fight alongside the infantry (Malalas, 464). For reasons that will become clearer shor
tly, the version given by Malalas is to be preferred.

  The Battle of Callinicum had ended in a clear defeat for Rome and Belisarius, wiping out the benefits of the earlier victory at Dara and giving the initiative once again to the Persians. The differences between the two battles now need to be explored.

  The circumstances surrounding the two battles were entirely different. At Dara, Belisarius fought a defensive battle within strict geographical limits. Therefore, Belisarius had the opportunity to dig ditches designed for a specific plan, knowing that the enemy would come to fight him at that place as the Persians wanted control of Dara. Furthermore, his position at the centre, possibly on slightly raised ground, gave him a view of the whole battlefield, making it possible for him to see where the enemy were sending their reserves and enabling him to react accordingly. In addition, the Persian reliance on fluid cavalry tactics resulted in a tendency for them to strike at perceived weak points in the enemy line. Belisarius’ use of ditches and his subsequent deployment at Dara allowed him to manufacture apparent weak points, tempting the Persians to attack and enabling him to pre-plan his counterattacks and rout the Persian assault troops.